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Abstract
There is an imminent need to address the healthcare disparities in accessing all COVID-19
medicinal products in developing countries. While logistical issues like inadequate production
facilities such as the lack of vaccines administration capacity, storage issues, gap between supply
and demand as well as vaccine hesitancy can certainly play a part in impeding COVID19
medicines distribution, patent monopolies and intellectual property protection laws further
exacerbated the problem, especially when vaccines were at its early stages of authorization.
Historical and contemporary case studies of efforts to challenge patents on HIV AVRs treatment
provide a useful lens through which we may glean insights into potential actions for challenging
current and future patents on emergency and essential medicines for COVID. Currently, there is
limited literature available that pinpoints the lessons learned regarding intellectual property
between the HIV and COVID-19 pandemic, and they also include analysis that is out of date due
to the quickly evolving situation of the availability of COVID-19 medicines. Therefore, the
literature will focus on providing the background information on existing solutions to improve
access to the HIV pandemic and applications of these strategies to the COVID-19 treatments by
analyzing the feasibility of legal mechanisms including TRIPS flexibilities, TRIPS waiver,
march-in-rights, and competing government patents. New global health initiatives brought up
during the COVID-19 pandemic such as Medicine patent pool to transfer technology and knowhow and COVAX and CTAP will also be discussed.
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2. Preface
My upbringing in Vietnam-a developing country whose medical system falls short due to
overpopulation, the lack of government findings, and lack of technologically advanced medical
equipment- has motivated me to learn about global health and access to treatment equity. During
the COVID-19 pandemic, as I have the privilege to access first-hand the available vaccines and
therapeutics living in a developed country like the United States, I realized that many vulnerable
populations, especially those in low and middle-income countries like Vietnam were struggling
to acquire vaccines and treatments to COVID-19 infections. It has been rather disheartening that
as the pandemic prolongs, the gap in healthcare inequities widens, disproportionally worsening
the situations in these under-privileged areas. Furthermore, the COVID-19 pandemic is not the
first pandemic that exemplifies the disparities in global access to medicines. Upon further
research in the topic, I learned that there are many lessons from previous pandemics with regards
to access to medicines: most notably and relevantly is the HIV pandemic. I have chosen to
pursue this research proposal on the topic of “lessons learned from the HIV/AIDS pandemic and
access to medicines for COVID-19 treatment” to analyze existing challenges and solutions to
improve access to medicines during the HIV pandemic and their relevance to COVID-19.
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4. Introduction
a. Access to medicines and challenges of intellectual property rights protection
Access to medicines is intrinsically linked to the fundamental rights of health, and thus states are
obliged to strengthen their national health legislations to provide available, affordable,
accessible, and quality medicinal products. That is why the topic of pharmaceuticals
development, distribution, and availability regulations is important to realize the “the right to the
highest attainable standard of health” 1. With regards to SARS-CoV-2, ensuring access to the
most effective prophylactic and therapeutic treatments is integral to control the global
socioeconomical burden of COVID-19 and minimize fatalities. However, many low- and
middle-income countries encounter a range of obstacles in achieving this due to the underdeveloped infrastructures to manufacture and store medicines, uncompetitive financial offers for
essential medicines leading to national shortages of therapeutics especially during health
emergencies like pandemics, as well as the growing problem of infringing intellectual property
patents and legal sanctions.

b) Access to medicines during the HIV and COVID-19 pandemic
The COVID-19 pandemic, like many of the previous health pandemics, has once again renewed
attention to the long-standing issues of intellectual property rights protection for pharmaceutical
monopolies on the manufacture of treatments and access to medicines. Luckily, the 40-year-old
HIV pandemic that has taken away more than 37 million lives globally since the 1980s has
taught us many important lessons to respond to health emergencies, to enhance our healthcare
¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾
1.

Marks, Stephen P. "Access to essential medicines as a component of the right to health." Realizing the right
to health. Zurich, Switzerland: Rüfer and Rub (2009): 82-101.
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systems and infrastructure capacity, and to improve equity in global access to medicines1. This
research project will attempt to analyze the existing solutions to improve access to medicines
during the HIV pandemic and their relevance to the COVID-19 pandemic as well as the
persisting limitations and new challenges that impede on the equitable global access to COVID19 treatment. It is worth mentioning that the project will not take a comparative approach of the
similarities and differences between the HIV and COVID-19 pandemic with regards to access to
medicines, but rather a selective analysis of lessons learned from the HIV pandemic to discuss
their applications to COVID-19 treatment. The paper will provide background information about
the current state of global access to medicines during the HIV and COVID-19 pandemics and the
impact of patents and intellectual property rights law-through the discussion on TRIPS, TRIPS
flexibilities, and TRIPS waiver. The literature review will then examine three legal pathways for
overriding and seizing patents on medicines employed during the HIV pandemic and could be
relevant to the COVID-19 pandemic. Following this section will be a description of the methods
used for the study. Next, the analysis section will further the investigation on the feasibility and
challenges of employing those strategies along with new mechanisms to improve access to
COVID-19 medicines. Finally, the paper will conclude with findings and implications of these
strategies in both short-term vs long-term consequences
5. Background information:
a. Current infection rate of COVID-19 and the global distribution of vaccines
The SARS-Cov2 virus has infected more than 265 million people and killed more than 5.2
¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾
1. D’Angelo, Alexa B., et al. "Breaking Bad Patents: Learning from HIV/AIDS to make COVID-19

treatments accessible." Global Public Health (2021): 1-14.
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million people globally since January 2020 1. Thanks to the unprecedentedly efficient speed of
vaccines research and development as well as the increasing global demand pressure to massscale the production of COVID19 vaccines, vaccination against COVID-19 has become one of
the biggest campaigns in the history of global vaccination. Yet, it is undeniable that many
countries, especially low- and middle-income countries have been grappling to gain access to
COVID-19 medicines. In fact, even before vaccines and therapeutics against COVID-19 became
available, some of the world’s richest countries have reserved enough doses to immunize their
national population multiple times over2. According to a New York Times analysis of data on
vaccine contracts collected by Duke University, Unicef and Airfinity- a science analytics
company-, “European Union could inoculate its residents twice, Britain and the United States
could do so four times over, and Canada six times over” in 2020, with no guarantee that any
particular vaccine would succeed 2. As of March, 2021 few African nations had received a single
shipment of shots while at the time, 145 doses were administered for every 100 people in the U.S
As of December 11th, 2021, “more than 8.37 billion doses have been administered across 184
countries” with roughly 38.7 million doses a day1. Yet, the poorest 20% of the world population
only has a vaccination rate of roughly 5%, one tenth slower than that of the richest countries1.
Thus, delivering billions of vaccines worldwide to halt COVID19 infection and fast emergence
of mutate variants remains a big logistical challenge 1. At this pace, it is estimated that it will
take approximately “another 4 months before 75% of the world population has received at least
one dose” 1. According to infectious disease experts, the COVID-19 vaccination rate needs to be
¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾
1. Tom Randall et al. “More Than 8.45 Billion ShotsGiven: Covid-19 Tracker.” Bloomberg
(2021).
2. Twohey, M., K. Collins, and K. Thomas. "With First Dibs on Vaccines, Rich Countries Have
‘Cleared the Shelves’." New York Times (2020).
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Figure 1: Unequitable global distribution of COVID-19 vaccines

reached at 70% to 85% of population before herd immunity is achieved, but boosters may be
required to keep up with the mutation variants1. Campaigns for booster shots has already begun
in many developed countries like the United States and Europe. Unsurprisingly, they have and
will continue to worsen vaccines hoarding, aggravating global vaccine distribution inequity.

b. Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and Public Health Agreement
(TRIPS) overview
Before the adoption of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and Public
Health Agreement (TRIPS) culminated in 1994 by the World Trade Organization, there was no
intellectual property law in the multilateral trading system that ensures protection of intellectual
property rights to promote technological innovation and knowledge1. Thus, pharmaceutical
¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾
1. Twohey, M., K. Collins, and K. Thomas. "With First Dibs on Vaccines, Rich Countries
Have ‘Cleared the Shelves’." New York Times (2020).
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products were excluded from national patent legislation and protection1. Under the intense
lobbying pressure by the United States, the International Intellectual Property Alliance,
supported by the European Union, Japan and many other developed nations, TRIPS was
negotiated during the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
and adopted by the WTO2. TRIPS provides an overarching global framework of patent issues,
establishing the “minimum standards on property rights for all member states” for 20 years and
mandated the granting of patents in all fields of technology, not excluding drugs, vaccines and
diagnostics from patenting2. TRIPS do allow individual nations to decide on the exact parameters
of their domestic laws. Following the adoption of TRIPS, TRIPS plus were concluded to include
other forms of market exclusivity and supplementary protection certificates (SPCs) to increase
the level of protection for patent holders beyond the levels prescribed by the original TRIPS
Agreement2. However, to enforce appropriate public health response measures under national
health emergencies, which are self-defined by national authorties, the TRIPS Agreement
incorporates certain "flexibilities," which are legal mechanisms that allow member states to
circumvent patent protection barriers 2. These flexibilities consist mainly of (1)
compulsory licenses, which allow a state to “authorize use a patented invention without the
consent of the patent holder but with remuneration,” (2) parallel imports, which allows “goods
legitimately sold more cheaply on another market may be imported without permission of the
rights holder,” and (3) transition period extension of the TRIPS Agreement for Least Developed
¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾
1. Matthews, D. N. "TRIPS flexibilities and access to medicines in developing countries:

The problem with technical assistance and free trade agreements." European Intellectual
Property Review (2005).
2. Archibugi, Daniele, and Andrea Filippetti. "The globalisation of intellectual property
rights: four learned lessons and four theses." Global Policy 1, no. 2 (2010): 137-149.
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Countries to exempt these countries from implementing TRIPS to issue patents on medicines and
thus give them more time to create a viable technological base1.

b) Access to medicines during the HIV pandemic
At the beginning of the HIV pandemics in the 1980s-1990s, antiretroviral (ARV) drugs were
largely available only to patent-holders and was extremely costly at around US$10,000 to
$15,000 per patient per year 2. Thus, as ARVs were becoming available in the industrialized
countries, “they remained far out of reach of most South Africans and others living in developing
countries”2. South Africa was the first country to take advantage of the TRIPS flexibilities to
increase access to AIDS treatment. Furthermore, the famous Big Pharma vs Nelson Mandela
case between the South African Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association along with 39 mostly
multinational pharmaceutical companies and the South Africa government over the legality of
compulsory licenses use “ was particularly significant because it showed the need for
clarifications on the flexibilities contained in the TRIPS to improve access to medicines" 3.
Particularly, following South Africa, pressure against the monopoly of medicines of the
pharmaceutical industry power from other low-income countries like Brazil, Thailand, nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and governments in low and middle-income countries,
advocacy groups, and healthcare professionals was critical in making AVRs more accessible3.
“First, civil society had to put access to treatment for HIV on the global political agenda; second,
¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾
1. World Trade Organization. "Responding to least developed countries’ special needs in intellectual
property." (2013).
2. Perez-Casas, Carmen, Cécile Mace, Daniel Berman, and Julia Double. "Accessing ARVs: untangling the
web of price reductions for developing countries." Geneva: Médecins Sans Frontieres (2001).
3. Mbali, Mandisa. "‘Pharma’v Mandela: South African Moral Capital in a Global Movement, 1998–2001."
In South African AIDS Activism and Global Health Politics, pp. 136-166. Palgrave Macmillan, London,
2013.
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effective and thus feasible in resource-poor settings; and third, the price of medicines had to
come down. Once these ingredients were in place and increased funding for ARVs followed,
investment in strengthening health systems to deliver treatment and care for was made
possible.1”
c. Access to medicines during the COVID-19 pandemic
Similar to the HIV pandemic, since the beginning of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, pharmaceutical
companies have been quick to apply for patent protection for any therapeutics with possible
efficacy. For instance, Gilead Sciences applied for patent protection for Remdesivir -a drug that
showed promise for treating SARS-CoV-2 in early clinical trials but was later found to have
negligible effects on COVID19 treatment outcomes-and was granted ‘orphan rights’ by the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration. The company holds “exclusive rights to manufacture Remdesivir
in most high-, middle- and low-income countries” while “limiting the sale of generic formulation
to just 127 LMICs.2” This strategy made it difficult to mass produce the generic version of
Remdesivir, skyrocketing the drug price to $3,120 per treatment course and thus not very
accessible to many socioeconomically underprivileged populations2. Many pharmaceutical
companies with therapeutics development currently in clinical trials follow the same pathway.
However, as of December 2021, only MSD’s molnupiravir and Pfizer’s PF-07321332 show
promising results against COVID19 infections 3. Take the recently approved COVID-19
therapeutic Molnupiravir-licensed by Merck-that has been showed in clinical trials to halve the
¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾
1. Berger, Jonathan, Alexandra Calmy, and Suerie Moon. "Driving a decade of change: HIV/AIDS, patents
and access to medicines for all." Journal of the International AIDS Society 14, no. 1 (2011): 1-12.
2. D’Angelo, Alexa B., Christian Grov, Jeremiah Johnson, and Nicholas Freudenberg. "Breaking Bad Patents:
Learning from HIV/AIDS to make COVID-19 treatments accessible." Global Public Health (2021): 1-14.
3. Stephanie Nolen. "Merck Will Share Formula for Its Covid Pill With Poor Countries." New York
Times (2021).
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mortality and hospitalization risk measures as an illustration1. The company has been publicly
praised for its agreement with the Medicines Patent Pool to issue voluntary licenses and allow
companies in 105 low- and middle income countries, mostly in Africa and Asia, to manufacture
the antiviral pill1. Unlike Pfizer and Moderna, vaccine patent holders that have refused to issue
abroad manufacturers license agreements and sharing their know how of vaccine technology
development, Merck is not only pending the issues of licensing eight large Indian companies to
increase the production of Molnupiravir generics, but it also has promised assistance with
technology transfer to many generic licensees to boost the pill production in developing
countries 1. These generic versions will significantly drive down the cost of a 5-day course
treatment, from $712 per course that the U.S. government has agreed to pay for its initial
purchase to approximately $20 per treatment1. Yet, according to Mr. Patrick Durisch during the
interview: “the practice of giving voluntary licenses to nations who cannot afford to pay high
prices for the drug while excluding high income countries or those with large pharmaceutical
industries is a standard practice adopted by pharmaceutical companies since the HIV
pandemic”3. “This is how pharmaceutical companies select their partners, deceive the public
notions of their commitment to access to medicines, and determine the rule of the game” 3. “It’s
not a coincidence that Merck has experience from H.I.V., internally, with their leadership and
culture, they know that if they don’t address the access challenges, they will be slammed.1”
¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾
1.

Stephanie Nolen. "Merck Will Share Formula for Its Covid Pill With Poor Countries." New York
Times (2021).

2.

D’Angelo, Alexa B., Christian Grov, Jeremiah Johnson, and Nicholas Freudenberg. "Breaking Bad Patents:
Learning from HIV/AIDS to make COVID-19 treatments accessible." Global Public Health (2021): 1-14.

3.

Durisch, Patrick. Personal interview. 24 November 2021
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Secondly, under this agreement, Merck is able to make profits of molnupiravir in wealthy nations
at significantly higher prices. Furthermore, like Gilead, the license restricts sales and contains
exclusion to most middle-income countries such as China, Russia, Chile or Colombia, Thailand
or Mexico as well as most nations in Latin America, predisposing citizens of these countries to
limited access to COVID-19 treatment.1

6. Research Methodology
a) Literature review: analysis of primary and secondary sources
In order to conduct a comprehensive analysis of access to medicines during the HIV and
COVID-19 pandemics, the method employed for this project was qualitative consisting primarily
of a literature review process and formal interviews with experts in the field of health care
policies and intellectual property rights protection. Information collected from both the review
and interviews will be integrated to investigate the efficiency of policies that promoted HIV
antiviral therapies accessibility in low and middle-income countries in the 1990s-2010s and their
application to the COVID treatments and vaccines distribution currently.

With regards to the literature review procedures, both primary and secondary sources were
included. Primary sources such as vaccines and therapeutics roll-out tracker websites, pharmaceutical companies agreements, monthly/annual reports from credible organizations like
the WHO, UNAIDS, non-governmental organizations such as the South Centre and Public Eye
were included. Secondary sources through searches on Google Scholar, Pub Med, and other
¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾
1. Stephanie Nolen. "Merck Will Share Formula for Its Covid Pill With Poor
Countries." New York Times (2021).

15

peer-reviewed articles on the topic of intellectual property rights, access to COVID-19 vaccines
and therapeutics, access to HIV antivirals, as well as TRIPS agreement, TRIPS flexibilities, and
TRIPS waiver proposal were included.

b) Interview procedures and analysis
With regards to the interviews, the data was collected through formal, semi-structured, virtual or
in-person, question-answer formatted meetings with professionals with expertise and knowledge
in the topics of intellectual property rights for pharmaceuticals, patents protection, and advocacy
activities for access to medicines during the HIV and COVID-19 pandemic. They were also
chosen from different advocacy backgrounds to diversify the perspectives on solutions to
increase access to medicines for COVID19 infections treatment. Expert informants were
contacted via email or were referred by personal and professional contacts. The literature review
was also used to provide contextual information to prepare for the interview discussions.

The first interview conducted was with Dr. Marcela Cristina Fogaca Vieira, Project Coordinator
of the Knowledge Network for Innovation and Access to Medicines, Global Health Centre. Dr.
Vieira has an educational background in Law and Social Sciences, with a concentration in
Intellectual Property Law and New Technologies of Information. She was also selected as an
informant for the research project as she had experience working as the coordinator of the
Brazilian civil society Working Group on Intellectual Property (GTPI) and legal consultant and
researcher at Access IBSA: Innovation & Access to Medicines in India, Brazil and South Africa
prior to joining the Global Health Centre. Her knowledge on access to medicines and intellectual
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property issues from a former civil society organization member and an academic expert now at
the Global Health Centre was conducted first to help contextualize and direct my project in the
beginning. The second interview conducted was with Dr. Nirmalya Syam, a senior program
officer at the South Centre, Geneva. It is without doubt that the advocacy roles of nongovernmental organizations like the South Centre played a significant part in improving access
to medicines in developing countries, especially during the pandemic periods. With his
educational background in intellectual property law negotiations, Dr. Syam has provided the
project much insight into the importance of TRIPS waiver during the COVID19 pandemic as
well as the lessons learned from the HIV pandemic from an NGO perspective. The third
interview was conducted with Mr. Patrick Durisch, a famous public figure and advocate for
equitable access to medicines and a leader in health policy at the Swiss NGO Public Eye. This
interview was not only to diversify the different roles taken by various civil societies and nongovernmental organizations in improving access to medicines but also to diversify the academic
backgrounds of interviewees. Specifically, Mr. Patrick Durisch’s perspective strictly as an public
health advocate to break pharmaceutical monopolies and barriers to medicine availability will be
different from lawyers and academic professionals like Dr. Marcela Cristina Fogaca Vieira and
Dr. Nirmalya Syam. Last but not least, the fourth interview was conducted with an anonymous
expert who works as an advisor on Innovation, IP & Public Health at Swiss Federal Institute of
Intellectual Property. This expert has experience with international trade relations and
Switzerland’s intellectual property policies as well as European Economic Law. This interview
offered a unique perspective on the topic of access to COVID-19 medicines and intellectual
property laws because Switzerland, along with many other European countries, opposed the
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suspension of TRIPS. Thus, many of the points discussed were completely contradicting with
previous interviewees.

c. Ethical considerations of the methodology procedures
All interviews were conducted ethically and professionally with the permission to record and
disclose information from each participants obtained verbally prior to the meetings. The project
has received the IRB approval before conducting interviews. The Human Subjects policies and
ethical research guidelines were strictly adhered to and request for anonymity and confidentiality
of research participants were also discussed with the interviewees and accordingly reported here.

7) Literature review
The main purpose of the literature is to provide background information on access to medicines
during the HIV pandemic and intellectual property rights law used in the past. The summary of
this literature review will illustrate the successes and failures in making ARVs more accessible
of three legal pathways to override patents on medicines namely: (1) TRIPS flexibility, (2)
march-in rights, and (3) government patents along with case studies. The analysis followed the
literature review will highlight the applications of these existing solutions to apply to improving
access to COVID-19 treatments as well as discuss the importance and feasibility of the TRIPS
waiver.
a/ TRIPS flexibilities
Prior to the HIV pandemic, TRIPS flexibilities were already used to either tighten or loosen
intellectual property rights protection for pharmaceuticals. However, these early attempts by
LMICs to utilize TRIPS flexibilities, by incorporating compulsory licenses and parallel imports
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into their national laws “faced aggressive retaliatory threats from patent holding countries, often
as a result of pressure from pharmaceutical companies and trade associations” 1. Following the
Big Pharma and Nelson Mandela case during the HIV pandemic was the birth of the Doha
declaration and it had provided further protection for countries utilizing TRIPS flexibilities by
“implementation challenges due to the limited manufacturing capacity of some member nations1.
On the other hand, there are many challenges when LMICs attempt to implement TRIPS
flexibilities to provide affordable generic treatment during the HIV pandemic that are likely to
persist during the COVID-19 pandemic, as outlined in detailed here in Table 12.

b) Case study of TRIPS flexibilities implementation and potential implications to COVID19
In 2006, during the HIV pandemic, when Rwanda used compulsory licenses to manufacture and
¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾
1. Subhan, Junaid. "Scrutinized: the TRIPS agreement and public health." McGill Journal of
Medicine: MJM 9, no. 2 (2006): 152.
2.

D’Angelo, Alexa B., Christian Grov, Jeremiah Johnson, and Nicholas Freudenberg. "Breaking
Bad Patents: Learning from HIV/AIDS to make COVID-19 treatments accessible." Global Public
Health (2021): 1-14.

import ARVs from Canada into Rwanda through the generic manufacturer Apotex, the use was
complicated with much “redtaping” 1. The Rwandan government was forced “to comply not only
with TRIPS articles, but also with Canadian patent law,” causing constant delays from meeting
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the formality of requesting imports, prolonged negotiation between Apotex-the generic
manufacturer- and the patent holding companies for 30 days on royalty deal agreement before
they were granted a compulsory license from the WTO1. “This entire process took thirteen
months, followed by five months to manufacture the ARVs for importation”1. The legal hurdles,
little financial incentives in return, and long process proved to be unexpectedly strenuous for the
generic manufacturer Apotex and they proceeded to make a public announcement that ” [they
will be unwilling to participate in compulsory licensing and importation following this
experience” 1. Dr. Syam commented that this case has discouraged other generic manufacturers
from participating in similar efforts and thus might be inefficient to use during the COVID-19
pandemic 2. Additionally, the complicating requirements of labelling and packaging of the final
generic products with the compulsory licenses also add to the burden 2.

b/ March-in rights
The second legislation worth highlighting to increase access to medicines during the HIV
pandemic and relevant to the COVID19 pandemic is the Bayh–Dole Act adopted in 1980 in the
United States. The bill addresses patent rights on inventions developed using government
funding for universities, non-profit organizations and small businesses3.
¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾
1. Kohler, Jillian Clare, Joel Lexchin, Victoria Kuek, and James Orbinski. "Canada's Access to Medicines
Regime: Promise or Failure of Humanitarian Effort?." Healthcare Policy 5, no. 3 (2010): 40.
2. Syam, Nirmalya. Personal interview. November, 25th, 2021
3. Thomas, John R. "March-In Rights Under the Bayh-Dole Act." (2016).

It “allows the government to break industry held patents on inventions that are needed by the
public: a process referred to as ‘march-in rights. 1” March-in rights can be used to seize patents
on government funded inventions and challenge pharmaceutical patent holders to benefit the
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public commercialization of essential medicines1. Like the use of TRIPS flexibilities, march-inrights are subjected to enormous opposing pressures and lobbying by pharmaceutical companies.

c/ Case study of march-in-rights:
Ritonavir is an HIV protease inhibitor funded by the US government through the ‘National
Cooperative Drug Discovery Group for AIDS’ grant. In response to Abbott’s increase in
ritonavir price by 400% in 2004, Essential Inventions, an organization committed to accessible
distribution of essential inventions, petitioned the US government to enforce the march-in rights
to overturn Abbott Laboratories’ patent on ritonavir. The proposal was supported by over 100
HIV/AIDS groups and doctors2 . Although NIH denied to use march-in rights in this case due to
the “integral partnerships between the NIH and industry, ”the public backlash of the petition was
significant enough that “Abbott Laboratories agreed to waive ritonavir price increase for
government insured patients. 2”

Until the present day, march-in rights have never been used in the United States to reclaim
patents or to challenge pharmaceutical patents or the expensive setting of drug prices because the
government is reluctant to challenge the pharmaceutical industry. However, as previously
¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾
1.
2.

Thomas, John R. "March-In Rights Under the Bayh-Dole Act." (2016).
D’Angelo, Alexa B., Christian Grov, Jeremiah Johnson, and Nicholas Freudenberg. "Breaking
Bad Patents: Learning from HIV/AIDS to make COVID-19 treatments accessible." Global Public
Health (2021): 1-14.

discussed from the literature review section, implementation of march in rights is encountered
with many political partnership and economic challenges, as summarized in Table 2 1
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d/ Government patents
Lastly, closely linked to the march in rights, the third mechanism is to use government patents.
According to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, “pharmaceutical advances funded by taxpayer money can lead to duplicate patents” if the government takes action to hold a competing
patent 1.

e/ Case study: government patents
In early 2019, the PrEP4All Campaign conducted a careful review of the U.S. government’s
PrEP patents and discovered that “the CDC held legally enforceable patents on PrEP” 1.
Eventually, with public pressure on the CDC to reclaim its patent against Gilead to drive down
¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾
1. D’Angelo, Alexa B., Christian Grov, Jeremiah Johnson, and Nicholas Freudenberg.
"Breaking Bad Patents: Learning from HIV/AIDS to make COVID-19 treatments
accessible." Global Public Health (2021): 1-14.
the cost of PrEP, “the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), on behalf of the CDC,
filed a patent infringement suit against Gilead Sciences, claiming the company infringed
on four patents issued by the United States Patent and Trademark Office for PrEP” in late 2019 1.
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Although the case concluded in 01/2021 with the Government’s motion to strike and motion to
dismiss denied by the court ruling, it is historically important because the United States doesn’t
regularly enforce its intellectual property rights against drug manufacturers 1. Secondly, it paved
the way for future patent claims over other government funded medicines, notably for the
COVID-19 medicines, many of which are publicly funded. The challenges of employing
government patents as well as suggestion to overcome them are summarized in Table 3 below1.
The application of the government patents to the COVID-19 medicines will be explored further
in depth in the following analysis section.
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"Breaking Bad Patents: Learning from HIV/AIDS to make COVID-19 treatments
accessible." Global Public Health (2021): 1-14.
8. Analysis: application to the COVID-19 pandemic
a/ TRIPS Flexibility during the HIV and COVID-19 pandemic: challenges with using
compulsory licenses for COVID-19 medicines.
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The use of the TRIPS flexibilities like compulsory licenses and parallel imports was successful
in increasing access to AVRs during the HIV pandemic, so many experts believed that this
historical use potentially could pave the way to allow for easier use of the TRIPS flexibilities in
future health emergencies like the COVID19 pandemic. In fact, in March 2020, Israel was the
first country to apply for a compulsory license for lopinavir /ritonavir for the treatment of SARSCoV-2- but the drug was later proved to be not efficacious” and many other countries have
followed the move as more COVID-19 drugs emerge 1. However, as the pandemic prolongs, it
seems like employing TRIPS flexibilities might not efficient and applicable for COVID19
vaccines. TRIPS flexibilities worked well during the HIV pandemic because the “reverse
engineering” method of small molecule therapies were relatively simple to carry out by generic
pharmaceutical companies. Thus, as a long as legal barriers created by TRIPS are removed by
using TRIPS flexibilities, mass-production of AVRs was easily obtained.

With regards to the COVID-19 pandemic, while TRIPS flexibilities like compulsory licenses can
certainly still be valid to allow generic production and improve access to small molecule
therapeutics like Molnupiravir in developing countries, their application will not extend to
manufacturing procedures that require a more detailed and sophisticated transfer of know-how
than the simple reverse engineering method. The second disadvantage of compulsory
¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾
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licenses is that it does not cover other forms of IP rights such as copyrights, industrial designs,
and trade secrets. This data is extremely important for successful reverse engineering and
surveillance of equitable distribution of medicines worldwide1. Thirdly, according to Dr. Syam,
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compulsory license can only be issued for a particular drug/therapeutic at a time3. “The
BioNTech/Pfizer vaccine contains 280 ingredients sourced from 19 countries. Moderna’s
AstraZeneca’s and Johnson & Johnson’s are similarly complex” claimed the International
Federal of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associations (IFRMA)1. That is not to mention the
complexity and heavily interconnected network analysis of mRNA-based vaccine candidates for
COVID-19 as shown in the figure below2. Given the diversity of Covid vaccines and
complexities of the supply chain for messenger RNA (mRNA) and viral vector vaccines, this
case-by-case approach would not be efficient due to the cumbersome and time-consuming
process required to obtain the licenses for each and every patented component or process.
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Fourthly, lessons from the HIV pandemic have shown that past uses of compulsory licenses are
often challenged by “high royalties and limitations on the number of products/doses,” and that
countries with historical usage of compulsory licenses are under the sociopolitical pressures of
the EU and the US to forfeit other trade rights. For instance, US threated to stop funding for Pax25

Colombia when Columbia applied for compulsory license over Glivec 1. Therefore, these
challenges will likely continue to be relevant to the COVID19 pandemic,

b/ TRIPS waiver
With all the difficulties previously discussed of using TRIPS flexibilities, the solution to improve
the access to medicines without infringing on patents and intellectual property laws is a TRIPS
waiver. On 2 October 2020, India and South Africa proposed to the World Trade Organization
(WTO) the TRIPS waiver, with the support of 62 WTO member states2 . This proposal is to
“temporarily waive intellectual property rights protections for technologies needed to prevent,
contain, or treat COVID-19, including vaccines and vaccine-related technologies” 2. Since its
proposal, more than 100 low-income countries have supported this proposal, but many highincome countries, including some European Union (EU) member states, the UK, Japan, Canada,
and Australia have announced their opposition2. Surprisingly, on May 5, 2021, the US’s Biden
administration announced their support for negotiating this waiver, although no legal actions of
support have been carried out2. The map of countries that support and oppose the waiver is
shown below3.
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On the other hand, opposition against the TRIPS waiver has also been raised by many developed
countries, including Switzerland, Japan, the UK, and many other EU countries. According to the
interviewed expert from the Swiss Intellectual Property Rights Office, “the problem is not
protection of intellectual property but a lack of sufficiently large production facilities, supply and
demand efforts such as the lack of vaccines administration capacity, storage issues, as well as
vaccine hesitancy” 1. Thus, proving a blueprint of the vaccine recipe to developing countries
through TRIPS waiver will not resolve the issue. This echoed the statement made in the Neue
Zürcher Zeitung paper, saying that it isn’t “enough to have the recipe, you need different
ingredients, a lot of know-how and infrastructure” 1.
Furthermore, “many thousands of vaccine doses have been destroyed in African countries
because they've exceeded their expiry dates”. More specifically, Malawi has destroyed almost
20,000 doses of the AstraZeneca (AZ) vaccine, while South Sudan announced it would destroy
59,000 doses 2. Similarly, the Democratic Republic of Congo gave away 1.3 million out of the
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2. Odhiambo, R. "Malawi burns thousands of expired AstraZeneca Covid-19 vaccine doses." BBC
News (2021).
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1.7 million AstraZeneca doses it had received from Covax because it couldn’t administer them
before they expired1. Most recently, South Africa has requested to stop receiving donated
vaccines from COVAX as vaccine hesitancy and public distrust in the national public health
system and government halt the vaccination rate1.
According to the interviewed representative from the Swiss IP office, clearly the problem was
not the lack of vaccine availability or intellectual property rights but rather the supply and
demand issues, the lack of funding in infrastructure, understaffed healthcare work force to
administer the shots, as well as refrigeration and transportation network and public health
education to address the community distrust1,3. Secondly, the opponents are concerned that
waiving patent protection would discourage private investments, research and development of
new COVID-19 medicines. “Why should you invest your money in risky research projects in the
future if the patent is then revoked if it is successful? That stifles innovation,” René Buholzer,
the head of the Swiss industry lobby group Interpharma 2.

c/ March-in-rights and government patents:
The implications and use of march-rights might be critically relevant to improving the access to
COVID19 medicines. After “the 2003 SARS outbreak, the NIH immediately spent 700 million
on coronavirus research 4. According to Dr. Vieira, many of the current COVID-19
¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾
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vaccines development were funded publicly. Preliminary findings from the Global Health
Centre, Geneva showed that R&D investments for the development of COVID vaccines are
“primarily generated by public sources (98.12% of the USD 5.9 billion tracked).1” The
Congressional Budget Office also estimated that the Biomedical Research and Development
Authority (BARDA) alone has spent $19.3 billion on COVID-19 vaccine development2. The
United States and Germany governments are by far the largest public investors in vaccine R&D
and private companies and academic groups such as Moderna, Johnson & Johnson,
BioNTech/Pfizer, CureVac and the University of Oxford are the primary recipients of R&D
funding.1 As such, the public has financially through three mechanisms. First, it supported the
cost for additional preclinical and clinical studies: “Johnson and Johnson, Moderna, Sanofi, and
AstraZeneca together are estimated to have received more than $2.7 billion from the federal
government to cover expenses related to human clinical trials”2. Secondly, the development of
vaccines is usually associated with much investment risk for pharmaceutical companies as it
often consists of a long study and testing process and complicated manufacturing capacity. The
federal government basically insulate these companies from these commercial risks by (1)
ensuring that there would be “sufficient manufacturing capacity to produce the necessary volume
of vaccines” and (2) making large purchase commitments at “predetermined quantities and high
prices enough to guarantee a healthy return.” 2 Although pharmaceutical contracts on pre-order
remained largely obscure, many public sources revealed that “Johnson and Johnson had a $1
billion contract for 100 million doses of their vaccine. Moderna had contracts totaling $4.95
¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾
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billion to produce 300 million doses. Pfizer, a firm that claims to not have received funding from
the government, had advance purchase contracts totaling $5.97 billion for 300 million doses” 1.
Therefore, “many medicines and devices emerging from federally funded coronavirus research
will be subject to the use of march-in rights.” 2

d/ Sharing of know-how: the Medicines Patent Pool
In May, 2020, before the success of any COVID-19 medicines was achieved, the President
Alvarado of Costa Rica has called on the need for solidarity to create a technology pooling
initiative and ensure access to COVID-19 health products for all: “It’s a Solidarity call to action
to Member States, to academia, to companies, research institutions and cooperation agencies,
based on global social responsibility, on a voluntary basis, promoting more global nonexclusive
voluntary licensing3. The platform will “pool data, knowledge and intellectual property for
existing or new COVID-19 health products to deliver ‘global public goods’ for all people and all
countries. Through the open sharing of science and data, numerous companies will be able to
access the information they need to produce the technologies, thereby scaling up availability
worldwide, lowering costs and increasing access.” 3 Since then, the Medicines Patent Pool has
expanded its mandate to also include “any health technology that could contribute to the global
response to COVID-19.” 3 Agreements to share the know-how of therapeutics development by
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Merck and Pfizer were promising in ensuring increased availability to COVID-19 medicines.
However, it is concerning that up to the present, Moderna and Pfizer have not shown willingness
to share their vaccine development technology, arguing that the developing countries lack
necessary resources and capacity to manufacture the vaccines even with the shared technology 1.
e/ COVAX and GAVI
To ensure equitable distribution of vaccines and therapeutics and increase the solidarity by
several governments or other agencies, the COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX)
initiative- supported by the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI), Coalition
for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI), and the World Health Organization (WHO)- was
established. Its primary goal is to provide vaccines to 92 lower-income countries, financed by
cash donations by governments and organizations2. For instance, the United States has donated
$2.5 billion and Germany has donated $1.1 billion to COVAX.3 Besides from precuring vaccine
shots and redistribute them to low- and middle-income countries, the initiative also acted as “an
intermediary between those countries and drug companies” to ensure that countries can buy
doses without jumping ahead in line regardless of the difference in their financial offers. 3
Although COVAX has made substantial contribution to providing vaccines to low- and middleincome countries with 610 million doses delivered as of December, 2021, it has encountered
many criticisms. Firstly, donation promises by wealthy nations have very time frames of their
donations: some countries “specify that doses will arrive in early 2021, while others are more
vague, indicating by the end of next year.” 1 Just because you’ve purchased 100 million doses
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doesn’t mean you’ll get 100 million doses in December,” said Kendall Hoyt, an assistant
professor of medicine at Dartmouth. 1 This makes it difficult to set up expectations and gauge the
severity of vaccines deficiency, especially when considering the importance of early vaccination
against the fast mutation rate of SARS-CoV2. Furthermore, although these movements have
provided millions of COVID vaccine shots to developing countries, they have not done much to
fight for the transfer of technology and know-how to develop and scale up vaccines and
therapeutics production 1.

9) Findings and Interpretation
Interpreting the validity and implications of the discussed intellectual property protection laws
and mechanisms to increase access to COVID19 medicines is a challenging task as (1) the
situation is quickly evolving with new emergence of new therapeutics and vaccines and (2) these
mechanisms are subjected to continuous and on-going debates on both sides.

a) A comprehensive approach is needed to improve access to COVID-19 medicines
According to Mr. Patrick Durisch, he believes that although IP laws have always created big
barriers to access, their consequences and negative influence on access to medicines during the
HIV and COVID-19 pandemic are different2.
With regards to the HIV pandemic, “the main obstacle was that patents led to highly-priced
AVRs, so it was more an issue of affordability than and less an issue of availability”1. Indeed,
¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾
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although “the annual price of first-line antiretroviral drugs has tremendously decreased from over
US $ 10 000 per person in 2000 to less than US $ 116 for the cheapest WHO-recommended firstline antiretroviral regimen in the first quarter of 2010, a reduction of nearly 99%,” the cost of the
therapeutics still remained one of the biggest barriers to increasing access to treatment and care
services2. With regards to the COVID19 pandemic, the issues are more complicated. “There are
issues of affordability but also insufficient productions as there was a sudden huge global
demand, lack of know-how sharing, etc” said Mr. Patrick Durisch3. Thus, with herd-immunity
achievement as the public health priority, the solution needs to be comprehensive to address a
range of problems including “a massive drive of technology transfer, capacity expansion, and
supply line coordination to bring vaccine supply in line with global demand” 4. This cannot be
simply achieved by employing the cumbersome TRIPS flexibilities nor just distributed donated
vaccine shots through COVAX while many wealthy countries continue to hoard vaccines for
booster shots despite WHO strong recommendation against it.

b/ Implications of implementing the TRIPS waiver: short-term vs long-term expectations
In the discussion of the TRIPS waiver, we need to be reminded that the COVID-19 pandemic is
far from over and solutions to increase access to medicines should be considered from a longterm perspective over short-term. Obvious advantages of adopting the TRIPS waiver would
allow generic manufactures to access the know-how of vaccines development and manufacture
¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾
1. Berger, Jonathan, Alexandra Calmy, and Suerie Moon. "Driving a decade of change: HIV/AIDS,
patents and access to medicines for all." Journal of the International AIDS Society 14, no. 1
(2011): 1-12.
2. UNAIDS, WHO. "UNDP. Using TRIPS flexibilities to improve access to HIV treatment. Policy
brief." (2011).
3. Durisch, Patrick. Personal interview. 24 November 2021
4. Brink Lindsey. “Why intellectual property and pandemics don’t mix.” Brookings. 2021

33

cheaper vaccines and drugs to meet the surging needs as soon as possible without the fear of
infringing on patents and intellectual property rights 1.
Furthermore, the TRIPS waiver can potentially be extended to allow all countries to choose to
neither grant nor enforce patents and other intellectual property (IP) related to COVID-19 drugs,
vaccines, diagnostics and other technologies for the duration of the pandemic, until global herd
immunity is achieved, with a possible termination period set at no more than three years 1. This is
a critical difference to compulsory licenses which only allow state to circumvent patentee’s
rights to access to one particular drug or therapeutic 1.
Secondly, in response to the concern of TRIPS waiver opponent that even with blueprints of
vaccine recipe of the waiver of patents on vaccines, low- and middle-income countries would not
have the capacity to manufacture them due to inadequate technical advances, Dr. Syam called it
a rather “colonial thinking” and condescending approach from wealthy patent holders2.
According to him, the sharing of vaccines know-how is complicated as far as technology is
concerned but it is not impossible to be done2. He argued that developing countries have
manufacturing experience with vaccines. For instance, nucleic acid vaccines have been studied in
India for a long time and the country has successfully developed and approved (for emergency
use) a new DNA COVID19 vaccines in September, 20213. Indeed, these breakthroughs in
vaccine research and developments are proof that many generic companies in low- and middleincome countries are capable of vaccines production scale-up if proper transfer of know-how and
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technology is executed. The bottom line is there are usually ways to turn around with and
without the know-how. India, for instance, might not necessarily has the resources and it might
some time to set up the infrastructures. Yet, again the scientific capacity is there and will be
more efficient with free access to the know-how transfer, especially when considering that the
fighting the pandemic is a long-term effort and not a short-term battle.
Thirdly, in response to the belief that the TRIPS waiver would discourage research and vaccine
development and that it is not justifiable for pharmaceutical companies to invest in high-risk
vaccine development only to receive patents protection suspension, it is important to reevaluate
the risk taken by private pharmaceutical companies over the course of vaccines and therapeutics
developments. Patent laws work on the idea that the incentives for pharmaceutical industries to
take on risks to develop new inventions in the long run are offset by financial gains at the
expense of slower distribution of medicines in a short run1. However, as previously explained,
since much of the research and development of COVID-19 medicines are publicly funded, and
the commercial risks absorbed by large contracts of preorders by federal governments,
pharmaceutical companies cannot claim the same bargain from the 20-year monopoly like usual.
Additionally, during pandemics and other public health emergencies, measures should be taken
to speed up distribution not to slower the diffusion of therapeutics.

10. Strengths and limitations of the methodology
A strength of this methodology is that it allows for an analysis of diverse perspectives on the
challenges and solutions to improve access to COVID19 medicines. Yet, there are a few
limitations associated with the qualitative nature of the methodology. Firstly, due to the small
¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾
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sample size of representatives from each organization that were interviewed, the analysis drawn
from their statements remained subjective and does not necessarily reflect the organization’s
mandates. Furthermore, due to limited research time to one-month span and geographic
limitations, initially planned interviews with experts from many important organizations and
initiatives such as the WHO, UN, and GAVI were not conducted. Future projects with interviews
with these organizations can further the insights on health policies relevant to COVID10
treatment availability.
It is also important, however, to note that the knowledge of COVID-19 and availability of
medicines both with regards to research and distribution equity continue to rapidly evolve
globally. Therefore, certain interpretations of the discussed legal mechanisms may no longer be
relevant in the future.

11. Conclusions
In this article, we have explored multiple strategies by which governments, ideally in partnership
with civil society groups, can learn from previous healthcare emergencies like the HIV pandemic
to improve access to COVID-19 medicines. Due to the quickly changing situation of COVID-19
infections and medicines availability, these include but not limited to TRIPS flexibilities, TRIPS
waiver, march-in-rights, competing government patents, Medicine patent pool to transfer
technology and know-how, as well as global health initiatives like COVAX and CTAP.
The first lesson learned from the HIV pandemic was that we needed a stronger and more
collaborative coalition between the government, private sector such as pharmaceutical
companies, non-governmental organizations, and civil societies to accelerate the research and
development of as well as distribution of medicines.” For instance, through the Medicines Patent
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Pool, technology transfer agreements can be made, and they might be a good solution to
encourage collaboration for scientific findings and knowledge between research institutions and
universities, or business labs, to public and private users to protect public health. Secondly the
importance of advocacy groups as presented through the analysis of case studies from the
literature review was clearly illustrated during national health emergencies as they created
pressure on both pharmaceutical industries and the government to take actions to prioritize
accessibility and affordability of medicines over financial gains. Furthermore, before the HIV
pandemic, “civil societies were usually taken for granted,” said Dr. Vieira from the Graduate
Institute. It is usually the WHO and UN that attract the most attention and praised for the state of
global health. However, after the HIV pandemic, greater attention, responsibility, and
expectations to the importance of civil societies, advocacy groups, and non-governmental
organizations were gained to improve access to medicines during pandemics like the COVID-19.
Thirdly, while the TRIPS flexibilities including compulsory licenses and parallel imports worked
well to improve the manufacturing scale-up of HIV antiviral generics and might potentially
extend to improving access to COVID19 small molecule therapeutics, they offer little values to
improve access to COVID-19 vaccines. Thus, the TRIPS waiver as an alternative strategy for
making COVID-19 medicines, medical devices and knowledge more easily accessible must be
taken seriously. This should take priority over financial benefits gained by private sectors like
pharmaceutical companies, especially when considering the fact that most COVID19 medicines
development were funded by the public and pharmaceutical companies insulated from
commercials risks thanks to huge preorder commitments from the governments. Fourthly, the
HIV pandemic has also demonstrated that there many under-utilized mechanisms to challenging
patents on medicines in the United States such as the Bayh Dole Act’s march-in rights and
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competing government patents, first used during the HIV pandemic and could be used for
COVID19 medicines. All in all, with a comprehensive, integrative, and collaborative approach of
these strategies as well as the pending outcome of the TRIPS waiver implementation, past
inequitable access to COVID-19 medicines could be better tackled.
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